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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case

The issue in this case, which is before the Idaho Supreme Court as a certified question of
law, is whether Respondent Corizon, LLC ("Corizon") is subject to the Idaho Medicaid rate in
Idaho Code § 20-237B and therefore must pay non-contracted off-site medical providers who
provide medical care to prisoners at the Medicaid rate. This Court has yet to address the
application of Idaho Code § 20-237B.

B.

Statement of Facts

On January I, 2011, Correctional Medical Services, Inc. (a predecessor company of
Corizon) and Appellant Pocatello Hospital LLC d/b/a Portneuf Medical Center ("PMC") entered
into a Hospital Services Agreement ("HSA''). (R. Vol. I, p. 22, Amended Complaint and
Demand For Jury Trial.) As part of the agreement, Corizon engaged PMC to provide
hospitalization, inpatient, and outpatient services to IDOC inmates. (Id.) Pursuant to the HSA,
PMC was to provide hospitalization and other inpatient and outpatient medical services to IDOC
inmates. (R. Vol. 3, p. 664, Decision and Order on Certification.) PMC also agreed to a
discounted reimbursement rate for those medical services. (Id.) PMC submitted all claims to
Corizon. (Id.) Corizon reimbursed PMC for the medical services that it provided to IDOC
inmates as provided in the HSA. (Id.)
On July 30, 2013, the State of Idaho issued a Healthcare Services Request for Proposal
("RFP"), by which the State sought a privatized healthcare provider to provide healthcare,
mental health, dental, vision, specialty care, and pharmaceutical services to prisoners

incarcerated within the State of Idaho's correctional system. (R. Vol. 1, p. 64, Memorandum in
Support of Joint Motion to Certify Question of Law to the Idaho Supreme Court.) Prior to
issuing the RFP, the IDOC evaluated Idaho Code § 20-237B to determine the process and/or
program necessary to access the Idaho Medicaid rates as provided in the statute. (R. Vol. 3, p.
657, Letter from IDOC to Portneuf Medical Center.) The State of Idaho amended the RFP to
include a provision for proposers to include an alternate per diem rate in the event that this
process and/or program was developed. (Id.) This amendment, Amendment 4, identified the
alternate per diem rates as follows: (l) Per Diem cost per Offender, per day as Per Diem One
with Medicaid Rates; and (2) Per Diem cost per Offender, per day a~ Per Diem Two with
Medicaid Rates. (R. Vol. 3, p. 641.)
The State of Idaho accepted Corizon's proposal, and a contract was executed ("IDOC
Contract"). (R. Vol. 1, p. 65.) The term of the IDOC Contract is from January 1, 2014 through
December 31, 2018, with the option for two additional two-year extensions. (R. Vol. 2, p. 431.)
After the IDOC Contract was executed, the IDOC determined that Corizon had the ability
and technology to process I hospitalization claims incurred by the IDOC under the IDOC
Contract, which means that Corizon now performs these tasks on behalf of the IDOC. (R. Vol. 3,
p. 657; see also R. Vol. 2, p. 422, letter from Pat Donaldson to Corizon.) As such, the IDOC
directed Corizon to proceed with the program, through which it would stand in the shoes of the

1 The

processing of hospitalization claims is the process/program identified in Amendment 4 to
the IDOC Contract.
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IDOC under Idaho Code § 20-237B and revise its per diem rate per offender per day to its
alternate per diem with Medicaid rates, effective July 1, 2014. (Id.) This revision decreased the
per diem rate by $0.65 per offender per day, an annual savings of approximately $1,675,000.00
and a total savings of over $15 million for Idaho taxpayers over the life of the contract with
Corizon, if all potential renewals are exercised. (Id.; see also R. Vol. 2, p. 421, Letter from
Corizon to Idaho Department of Purchasing, dated March 18, 2014.)
In May 2014, Corizon sent PMC notice that as of July 1, 2014, any contract rate within
the HSA would be superseded by the statutory reimbursement rate set forth in Idaho Code § 20237B. (R. Vol. 1, p. 67.) Similarly, on May 8, 2015, Pat Donaldson, IDOC Chief of Management
Services, sent PMC a letter stating, "Corizon Health was the successful proposer and after the
[IDOC] contract was executed, the IDOC implemented its program to allow Corizon to access
the Medicaid rates as provided in I.C. § 20-237B . . .. As such, the IDOC directed Corizon
Health to proceed with the program and to revise the per diem rate per offender per day to their
alternate per diem with Medicaid rates, effective July 1, 2014." (R. Vol. 3, p. 657) (underline
added.) Pursuant to the IDOC's instruction, Corizon began reimbursing PMC for the medical
services that it provided to IDOC inmates at Idaho Medicaid rates on July 1, 2014. (R. Vol. 1, p.
67.) On September 29, 2015, Corizon provided written notice to PMC that it was exercising its
option to terminate the HSA without cause. (R. Vol. 1, p. 68.) Pursuant to the notice, the HSA
terminated on December 31, 2015. (Id.)
From January 1, 2016 until present, no express contract has existed between Corizon and
PMC regarding the rate at which Corizon will reimburse PMC for medical services rendered to
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IDOC inmates. (Id.) Corizon's position is that the applicable reimbursement rate, is the Idaho
Medicaid rate, which is consistent with the IDOC's prior instruction. PMC's position is that
Corizon is required to pay PMC's full billed amount for medical services rendered from January
1, 2016 to present.

C.

Course of Proceedings

On January 20, 2016, PMC filed a complaint against Corizon in the United States District
Court for the District of Idaho as Case No. 4:16-CV-32-REB. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 1-6.) On August
28, 2016, PMC filed an amended complaint. (R. Vol.

1, pp. 19-33.) On September 8, 2016,

Corizon filed its answer to the amended complaint. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 34-56.) PMC contends that
Corizon has improperly reimbursed PMC for medical services rendered to prisoners at an
amount equal to the Idaho Medicaid reimbursement rate. (R. Vol. 1, p. 68.) In support of this
contention, PMC's amended complaint asserted three causes of action. (R. Vol. 1, p. 68.) The
first cause of action was for breach of a contract between Corizon and PMC, which terminated
on December 31, 2015. (R. Vol. 1, p. 68.) The first cause of action sought damages associated
with medical bills incurred on and before December 31, 2015. (R. Vol. 1, p. 68.) Ultimately,
however, the parties entered a stipulation whereby the breach of contract claim was dismissed.
(R. Vol. 1, p. 69.) The second and third causes of action are for breach of contract, through
which PMC claims that it is a third-party beneficiary of the IDOC Contract, and breach of
implied contract. (Id.) Both causes seek damages associated with medical bills incurred from
January 1, 2016, to the present time. (Id.)
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II.

ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL

This Court accepted the following certified question of law from the United States
District Court for the District of Idaho:
1. Whether, for purposes of the dispute in this lawsuit, the terms "state board of
correction" as used in Idaho Code § 20-2378(1) and "department of
correction" as used in Idaho Code § 20-2378(2), include privatized
correctional medical providers under contract with the Idaho Department of
Correction?

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"Courts of the United States may certify a controlling question of law in a pending action
to the Idaho Supreme Court for determination where there is no controlling precedent in the
decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court and the determination would materially advance the
orderly resolution of the litigation in the United States court." In re Certified Question of Law,
156 Idaho 77, 80,320 P.3d 1236, 1239 (2014) (citations omitted). This Court's role "is limited to
answering the certified question" when the question presented is narrow. Doe v. Boy Scouts of
Am., 159 Idaho 103, l05, 356 P.3d l049, l051 (2015) (citing Peone v. Regulus Stud Mills, Inc.,

113 Idaho 374, 375, 744 P.2d l02, l03 (1987) (noting that "to now decide [extraneous matters]
would result in an advisory opinion on a question not certified")). This Court exercises free
review over questions of law. Id.

IV.

ARGUMENT

The certified question before this Court is whether "for purposes of the dispute in this
lawsuit" Idaho Code

§

20-2378 caps the amount that Corizon may reimburse PMC for medical

services rendered to Idaho prisoners. This express limitation-"for purposes of the dispute in this
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lawsuit"- is critical because the particular facts at issue here matter and admit no other
conclusion. Yet, PMC ignores this and instead begins by asking the wrong question and then
attempts to interpret Idaho Code§ 20-237B in a vacuum.
The question before the Court is not, as PMC argues, whether, when the legislature wrote
"state board of correction" and "department of correction," those phrases also meant "privatized
correctional medical providers." Instead, the question is whether, in this particular dispute,
Corizon was acting as the IDOC, such that the statutory reimbursement rate cap in Idaho Code §
20-237B applies. The answer to this question turns on whether Corizon was acting as the agent
of the IDOC in this particular dispute. The answer is "yes," and one cannot seriously argue
otherwise. The IDOC is charged by statute with the care and maintenance of Idaho's prisoners.
See Idaho Code § 20-209( I). Also by statute, the IDOC has the authority to contract with private
entities, like Corizon, to perform these statutorily-mandated duties. See generally id. § 20-241A.
Those private contractors who fulfill such duties necessarily do so as agents of the IDOC. See
generally Vreeken v. Lockwood Engineering, 148 Idaho 89, 109, 218 P.3d 1150, 1170 (2009);
Bailey v. Ness, 109 Idaho 495, 497, 708 P.2d 900, 902 (1985); Hieb v. Minnesota Farmers
Union, 105 Idaho 694, 697, 672 P.2d 572, 575 (1983); Weatherby v. Weatherby Lumber Co., 94
Idaho 504,507,492 P.2d 43, 46 (1972).
There is no disputing that Corizon served as the agent of the IDOC "for purposes of the
dispute in this lawsuit" in processing hospitalization claims incurred by the IDOC for inmates
treated at PMC. Under its contract with the IDOC, Corizon sent State prisoners to PMC to
receive medical treatment.

In so doing, Corizon stood in the shoes of the IDOC. Corizon
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therefore was limited by Section 20-237B to reimbursing PMC for the services that it rendered at
the Medicaid rates. The IDOC itself, and not Corizon, was the first to reach this conclusion. (See
R. Vol. 3, p. 657.) As a result, the IDOC instructed Corizon to limit its reimbursements to the
Idaho Medicaid rate.
The IDOC's decision is entitled to deference under the four-factor standard adopted by
this Court in J.R. Simplot Co., Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 120 Idaho 849, 820 P.2d
1206 (1991). Each of these factors supports deferring to the IDOC's decision. The !DOC is
charged with administering Idaho Code § 20-237B as it relates to a statutory duty of the IDOC
(i.e., the health care of Idaho prisoners), and the !DOC has statutory authority to establish rules

in fulfilling those obligations. See Idaho Code § 20-212. Exercising its judgment, the IDOC
determined that Corizon had the ability and technology to fulfill some of the IDOC's statutory
obligations on the IDOC's behalf. Allowing Corizon to stand in the IDOC's shoes and to
reimburse other contractors at Medicaid rates both saves Idaho taxpayers money and is entirely
consistent with Idaho Code § 20-237B.

A.

Idaho Law Requires the State of Idaho to Care for its Prisoners, but It
Allows the State to Delegate this Responsibility to a Private Contractor, Who
Becomes an Agent of the State of Idaho.

Idaho's legislature has charged the IDOC with responsibility for the State's prisoners. At
the same time, it granted the IDOC the ability to delegate some of those responsibilities to
private contractors, like Corizon. In performing those responsibilities, the contractors act as
agents of the IDOC.
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Idaho Code

§

20-209(1) requires the IDOC to provide for the care and maintenance of its

prisoners:
The state board of correction shall have the control, direction and management of
such correctional facilities as may be acquired for use by the state board of
correction and all property owned or used in connection therewith, and shall
provide for the care, maintenance and employment of all prisoners now or
hereinafter committed to its custody.
Id. Under Idaho Code § 20-241 A, the IDOC also has the power to hire private contractors to

provide for the care and subsistence of its prisoners:
The state board of correction shall have the power and it shall be its duty:
( 1) To determine the availability of state facilities suitable for the detention and
confinement of prisoners held under authority of state law. If the state board of
correction determines that suitable state facilities are not available, it may enter
into an agreement with the proper authorities of the United States, another state, a
political subdivision of this state or another state, or a private prison contractor, to
provide for the safekeeping, care, subsistence, proper government, discipline, and
to provide programs for the reformation, rehabilitation and treatment of prisoners.
Facilities made available to the state board of correction by agreement may be in
this state, or in any other state, territory or possession of the United States. The
state board of correction shall not enter into an agreement with an authority
unable to provide the degree or kind of safekeeping, care and subsistence required
by state or federal laws, the constitution of the state of Idaho, the United States
constitution, and the rules adopted by the state board of correction. All contracts
or agreements entered into by the state board of correction and a private prison
contractor shall be subject to the provisions of this section and section 20-209,
Idaho Code.
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I.C. § 20-241A(1)2; see also I.C. § 20-2378. Such a contractor acts solely as an agent of the
State:
(a) An authority or private prison contractor, receiving physical custody for the
purpose of incarceration of a person sentenced by a court under the terms of an
agreement made under this section, shall be considered as acting solely as an
agent of this state. This state retains jurisdiction over a person incarcerated in an
institution of another state, the United States, a political subdivision of this state
or another state, or of a private institution;
I.C. § 20-241A(l)(a) (emphasis added).

B.

The Law of Agency Provides that Corizon Can Step into the Shoes of the
State of Idaho and Act for and in its Place for Purposes of Reimbursing OffSite Medical Providers.

As agent of the IDOC, Corizon steps into the shoes of the Department under the law of
agency. "The law of agency is based on the legal notion that a principal is considered to have
done himself or herself what he or she does by acting through another person." 2A C.J .S. Agency
§ 1; Weatherby, 94 Idaho at 507, 492 P.2d at 46 ("Persons dealing with an agent of a disclosed
principal must act toward the agent the same as though the principal himself were personally
involved."). "A principal-agent relationship is based upon delegation of authority from the
principal to the agent so that the agent is said to be representing the principal while alter egos are
seen in the law as being the same entity." 2A C.J.S. Agency§ 1. "[A]n agency relationship exists
when one person is authorized to represent and act for another in dealings with third parties. It is
one of the characteristics of the relationship that the agent steps into the shoes of the principal
The Statement of Purpose for Idaho Code§ 20-241A, which was enacted in 1997, "[p]rovides
for the conditions under which a private prison contractor may provide for the housing, care and
control of state inmates." 1997 Idaho Laws Ch. 223 (H.B. 137).
2
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and acts for the principal pursuant to the grant of authority vested in him or her by the principal."
Id. Stated another way, "[p ]ursuant to the grant of authority by the principal, the agent is the

representative of the principal and acts for, in the place of, and instead of, the principal." 3 Am.
Jur.2d Agency § l.
A "settled rule of agency [is] that an agent 'stands in the shoes' of his principal."
Monsanto Co. v. Benton Fann, 813 So. 2d 867, 874 (Ala. 2001). "Thus, an agent who has
incurred liability for his principal by acting in the line and scope of his employment also 'stands
in the shoes' of his principal with respect to the principal's rights in the transaction." Id.
(emphasis added); see also Vreeken, 148 Idaho at 109, 218 P.3d at 1170 (noting that the agent
binds the principal when the agent acts within the scope of authority); In re Estate of Capuzzi,
470 Mich. 399 (Mich. 2004) ("It is a longstanding legal principle that a duly authorized agent has
the power to act and bind the principal to the same extent as if the principal acted. A power of
attorney provides the agent with all the rights and responsibilities of the principal as outlined in
the agreement. In effect, the agent stands in the shoes of the principal.") (citations omitted); All
Bus. Corp. v. Choi, 634 S.E.2d 400, 404 (Ga. 2006) ("An agent, although innocent, may be
liable, because he stands in the shoes of his principal."); State v. Campbell, 756 N.W.2d 263,271
(Minn. Ct. App. 2008) ("Furthermore, a person acting as an attorney-in-fact under a POA 'is an
agent, one who stands in the shoes of a principal."); Bailey, 109 Idaho at 497, 708 P.2d at 902
(noting that the agent binds the principal when the agent acts within the scope of authority).
Additionally, "[w]hen a duly constituted agent acts in accordance with his instructions ...

he has power to affect the legal relations of the principal to the same extent as if the

IO

principal had so acted." Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Hapag Lloyd Container Linie, GmbH, 446

F.3d 313 (2d. Cir. 2006)(emphasis added); see Vreeken, 148 Idaho at 89, 218 P.3d at 1170;
Bailey, 109 Idaho at 497, 708 P.2d at 902; see also 2A C.J.S. Agency § 140 ("When a duly

constituted agent acts in accordance with its instructions the agent has power to affect the legal
relations of the principal to the same extent as if the principal had so acted since, in effect, the
agent stands in the shoes of the principal.").
Under these principles, Corizon is subject to the same statutory requirements and
restrictions as the IDOC with respect to those duties that the company contracted to perform3.
By contracting with the IDOC to provide health care to its prisoners and, in this instance. to
process hospitalization claims incurred by the IDOC for inmates treated at PMC, Corizon has
stepped into the shoes of the IDOC in relation to these functions. It is the agent of the IDOC in
relation to these functions. See Idaho Code § 20-241A(l); see also Druffel v. State Dep't of
Transp., 136 Idaho 853, 856, 41 P.3d 739, 742 (2002) (stating that the Idaho Supreme Court

assumes that the Legislature was aware of all other statutes and legal precedence at the time the
statute was passed). As the IDOC's agent with respect to the processing of medical claims, it
Since 2005, when Idaho Code § 20-237B was enacted, the IDOC has contracted with privatized
health care companies to provide health care to inmates in accordance with the Eighth
Amendment. See Allison v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., No. 1:05-CV-510-EJL, 2009 WL 205228,
at *7 (D. Idaho Jan. 28, 2009) (stating Prison Health Services, Inc., also a predecessor of
Corizon, ceased providing medical services to IDOC inmates on July 11, 2005); see also Noak v.
Idaho Dep't of Correction, 152 Idaho 305,307,271 P.3d 703, 705 (2012) (noting that PHS was
under contract with the IDOC on January 30, 2004); Monson v. Corizon, No. 1:l 1-CV-00468MHW, 2013 WL 3756440, at *l (D. Idaho July 11, 2013) (Corizon under contract with the
IDOC as of October 2011).

3
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necessarily follows that Corizon cannot exceed any limits set by the Idaho legislature on the
IDOC's authority. Hieb, 105 Idaho at 697, 672 P.2d at 575 (an agent cannot bind the principal
when an agent exceeds the authority given by the principal).
C.

As an Agent of the IDOC in the Provision of Health Care, Corizon Is Bound
to Comply with the Medicaid Rate of Reimbursement in Idaho Code § 20237B.

As the agent for the IDOC, Corizon acts for, in the place of, and instead of the IDOC in
processing hospitalization claims arising from treatment provided to Idaho prisoners. This makes
Corizon subject to all of the rules limiting the IDOC's authority in paying for such health care
services, including the Medicaid rate reimbursement cap in Idaho Code § 20-237B. The contract
between the IDOC and Corizon specifically contemplated that this cap might apply to Corizon.
(See Amendment 4, R. Vol. 3, p. 641.) Then, after the IDOC determined that Corizon could

process the IDOC's hospitalization claims, the IDOC instructed Corizon to revise its rates to the
Medicaid reimbursement rate. (See Letter from P. Donaldson to PMC, R. Vol. 3, p. 657.)
Pat Donaldson, IDOC Chief of Management Services, confirmed this instruction in his
May 8, 2015 letter to PMC, stating:

It was determined that Corizon Health had the ability and technology to
administer the processing of the hospitalization claims incurred by the IDOC
under its healthcare contract. As such, the IDOC directed Corizon Health to
proceed with the program and to revise the per diem rate per offender per day to
their alternate per diem Medicaid rates, effective on July 1, 2014. This decreased
the per diem rate by $0.65 per offender per day, or an annual savings of
approximately $1,675,000. This reduction equates to a savings of over $15
million for the taxpayers of Idaho over the life of the contract with Corizon
Health, if all potential renewals are exercised.
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(Id.) This instruction reflects the stated purpose of Idaho Code § 20-237B, which is to ensure

maximum cost-efficiency to the IDOC in negotiating its contractual agreements with privatized
correctional health care companies. In order to ameliorate the risk of uncontrollable financial risk
to the IDOC, the Idaho Legislature limited how much outside off-site medical providers would
be reimbursed for off-site medical care services they provided to prisoners. Limiting these offsite providers to the Idaho Medicaid reimbursement rate for medical services provided off-site
ensures that any contract with a privatized health care company will be more predictable and
cost-efficient for the IDOC.
Such an outcome is consistent with how statutes in Idaho are to be construed: "[a] statute
should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be rendered
superfluous or insignificant. Further, we do not presume that the legislature performed an idle act
by enacting a meaningless provision." Brown v. Caldwell School Dist., 127 Idaho 112, 117 898
P.2d 43, 48 (1995). Subsection (2)(a) of Idaho Code § 20-237B recognizes that the IDOC may
contract its obligation to provide health care to its prisoners to a privatized health care provider,
such as Corizon. Indeed, it is even more telling that the contracted health care model was in
existence at the time of the statute's enactment and the Statement of Purpose specifically noted
that the then current contract was set to expire September 30, 2005, and that the Department
would then issue a new contract, to begin October I, 2005. Interpreting the statute to exclude
Corizon renders the statute meaningless from the outset in light of the contemplated contractual
health care model. Further, a contrary interpretation creates the exact situation the legislature
intended to avoid-increased costs to the IDOC and thus the taxpayers due to an unpredictable

13

variable determined unilaterally by the respective health care providers. Thus, interpreting the
statute to exclude Corizon renders the statute meaningless and ultimately creates the very risk it
intended to mitigate, which is the current situation where PMC contends that Corizon must pay
the full invoiced amount4 for medical services that PMC provided to IDOC inmates after January
1, 2016:
To ameliorate the risk, the current legislation is intended to limit the Department's
exposure to the same level of risk assumed by the State of Idaho providing health
care to indigent citizens via Medicaid. Without this legislation, the Department's
risk will be an unpredictable variable determined unilaterally by the respective
health care providers.
LC.§ 20-237B, Statement of Purpose, Idaho Session Laws 157, S.B. 1036.
The IDOC delegated to Corizon its duty to process medical claims for services provided
to inmates, and Corizon, in assuming that duty, stepped into the shoes of the IDOC. As a result,
under Idaho Code§ 20-237B, the maximum that Corizon was permitted to pay a non-contracted
medical provider, such as PMC, was the Idaho Medicaid reimbursement rate. Moreover, Corizon
did not reach this conclusion unilaterally. Instead, the IDOC ultimately made this determination.
In so doing, it both ensured that its agent, Corizon, did not exceed the IDOC's own authority and
that instead the IDOC's responsibility under Idaho Code§ 20-237B was fulfilled.

PMC contends that the full billed amount represents its usual and customary fees. (R. Vol. 1, p.
24, Amended Complaint and Demand For Jury Trial.)

4
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D.

This Court Should Defer to the IDOC's Determination that Corizon Must
Adhere to the Medicaid Rate of Reimbursement in Idaho Code § 20-237B.

The four-factor test adopted by this Court in J.R. Simplot for determining when courts
should defer to an agency's construction of a statute supports the IDOC's construction of Idaho
Code § 20-2378 (and Corizon's position) in this case. Under this standard, the Court considers
whether:
1.

the agency is entrusted to administer the statute at issue;

2.

the agency's interpretation of the statute is reasonable;

3.

the statutory language does not expressly treat the precise question at issue; and

4.

any of the rationales underlying deference to an agency are present.

820 P.2d at 1219. Each of these four factors supports deference to the IDOC in this case.
There is little question that the first factor is satisfied here. As detailed above, the Idaho
legislature has given the IDOC responsibility to care for inmates and the power to contract with
private entities. See, e.g., Idaho Code §§ 20-209 and 20-241A. Section 20-212(1) expressly
directs the IDOC to "make all necessary rules to carry out the provisions of this chapter not
inconsistent with express statutes or the state constitution[.)"5 Thus, the legislature has entrusted
the IDOC to administer Idaho Code § 20-2378 and the other laws that comprise Title 20,

"[R]ule" is defined broadly in Idaho Code§ 20-212(2) as "the whole or a part of the board of
correction or department of correction's statement of general applicability that has been
promulgated in compliance with the provisions of this section and that implements, interprets or
prescribes: (a) Law or policy[.]"
5
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Chapter 2 of the Idaho Code6• Cf Pearl v. Bd. of Prof'l Discipline of Idaho State Bd. of Med.,
137 Idaho 107, 113, 44 P.3d 1162, 1168 (2001) ("It is clear that the Board may 'establish
pursuant to the administrative procedures act rules and regulations for the administration of this
chapter" (quoting Idaho Code§ 54-1806(2)).
The second and third factors - whether the agency's construction is reasonable and
whether the statutory language expressly treats the matter - also weigh in favor of deferring to
the IDOC. There is nothing in Idaho Code§ 20-237B that expressly answers whether an agent,
like Corizon, that processes medical claims can be subject to the Medicaid reimbursement cap:
20-237B. MEDICAL COSTS OF STATE PRISONERS HOUSED IN
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES.
( 1) The state board of correction shall pay to a provider of a medical
service for any and all prisoners, committed to the custody of the department of
correction, confined in a correctional facility, as defined in section 18-101 A( 1),
Idaho Code, an amount no greater than the reimbursement rate applicable based
on the Idaho medicaid reimbursement rate. This limitation applies to all medical
care services provided outside the facility, including hospitalizations, professional
services, durable and nondurable goods, prescription drugs and medications
provided to any and all prisoners confined in a correctional facility, as defined in
section 18-101 A( 1), Idaho Code. For required services that are not included in the
Idaho medicaid reimbursement schedule, the state board of correction shall pay
the reasonable value of such service.
(2) For the purposes of subsection ( 1) of this section, the term "provider
of a medical service" shall include only companies, professional associations and

"From its enactment to the present, IDAPA has exempted the Board [of Corrections], along
with the state militia from its coverage." Searcy v. Idaho State Bd. of Correction, 160 Idaho 546,
555, 376 P.3d 750, 759 (2016). "The constitutional and statutory grants of authority afford IDOC
and the Board wide-ranging authority over the management and operation of Idaho's prisons."
Id., 160 Idaho at 553,376 P.3d at 757.

6
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other health care service entities whose services are billed directly to the
department of correction. The term "provider of a medical service" shall exclude:
(a) Privatized correctional medical providers under contract with
the department of correction to provide health care to prison inmates;
(b) Private prison companies;
(c) Out-of-state correctional facilities
department of correction to house prisoners;

contracting with the

(d) County jails; and
(e) Companies, professional associat10ns and other health care
service entities whose services are provided within the terms of
agreements with privatized correctional medical providers under contract
with the department of correction, private prison companies and county
jails.
Id.

So, the statute does not address, let alone prohibit, the IDOC from determining that a

contractor acting on its behalf is subject to the Medicaid reimbursement rate. This silence alone
indicates that the IDOC's construction of the statute is reasonable.
The reasonableness of the IDOC's reading is further supported by the statutory
exemption from the cap that is found in Section 20-237B(2)(e). PMC wrongly contends that the
reference to "privatized correctional medical providers" in this exemption confirms that Corizon
is not subject to the statutory cap. (Br. at 17-19.) Instead, the opposite is true. The statutory
exemption reveals that the legislature envisioned instances in which the Medicaid reimbursement
cap could apply to a contractor, like Corizon. Indeed, the legislature prescribed only one instance
in which that cap would not apply to a privatized correctional medical provider-when there was
a contract between the provider and the health care service entity issuing the bills. It is
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undisputed that there was no such contract between Corizon and PMC for the time period at
issue.7
Moreover, if, as PMC contends, the statutory cap truly applies only to medical services
provided directly to the IDOC, why would the legislature include an exception for fees incurred
when a health service entity provided services pursuant to contract with a company like Corizon?
PMC's interpretation of the statute would render this exemption a nullity, a cardinal violation of
statutory construction. This Court has held that it "will not construe a statute in a way which
makes mere surplusage of provisions included therein." Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 149
Idaho 107, 116, 233 P.3d 38, 47 (2009) (quoting Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568, 571-72, 798
P.2d 27, 30-31 (1990)); see also Twin Lakes Canal Co. v. Choules, 151 Idaho 214, 218, 254
P.3d 1210, 1214 (2011) (holding that courts may not interpret a statute in a manner that would
"render it a nullity"). As a result, the exemption relied upon by PMC instead supports the
statute• s application here.
The final factor also supports deferring to the IDOC. This Court has described five
rationales underlying the rule of deference:
•

that a practical interpretation of the rule exists;

PMC places much import on the fact that it sends bills for services rendered to Corizon rather
than to the IDOC. Two points merit mention here. First, PMC sends bills to Corizon for the
obvious reason that Corizon is standing in the shoes of the IDOC with respect to its obligation to
process claims for medical services rendered to prisoners of the State. And, second, this issue
easily could be remedied by the IDOC and Corizon instructing PMC to send the bills to the
IDOC and then by the IDOC, in tum, sending the bills to Corizon. This reality serves to
highlight the misplaced import that PMC places on this provision.
7
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•

the presumption of legislative acquiescence;

•

reliance on the agency's expertise in interpretation of the rule;

•

the rationale of repose; and

•

the requirement of contemporaneous agency interpretation.

Canty v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 138 Idaho 178, 184, 59 P.3d 983, 989 (2002). All five of
these rationales need not be satisfied in order to justify deference to the agency. Rather, "[i]f one
or more of the rationales underlying the rule are present, and no 'cogent reason' exists for
denying the agency some deference, the court should afford 'considerable weight' to the
agency's statutory interpretation." J.R. Simplot, 820 P.2d at 1219.
Three of the five rationales are present here. The IDOC' s decision that Corizon is subject
to the statutory cap with respect to PMC is practical. Indeed, it makes sense that, absent an
exemption such as that contained in Section 20-237B(2)(e), the same statutory restriction that
applies to IDOC for payment of claims should also similarly limit the agent that stands in its
shoes when processing those same claims.
There also exists a fair presumption that the legislature has acquiesced in the IDOC' s
reading. In the more than three years since the IDOC instructed Corizon to charge the Medicaid
reimbursement rate, the legislature has not sought to amend the statute to undo the IDOC' s
decision. In enacting

§

20-237B, the Idaho legislature sought to limit State expenditures on

health care for prisoners. Under the IDOC's interpretation of the statute, it will succeed in doing
so. Millions of taxpayer dollars will be saved over the life of the IDOC's contract with Corizon.
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Finally, there is good reason to defer to the IDOC' s expertise in determining whether
Corizon is acting as its agent for purposes of Section 20-237B. As detailed above, the IDOC is
charged with the welfare of State prisoners and has authority to issue rules in fulfillment of those
responsibilities. In this case, the IDOC utilized its expertise and discretion in finding that
Corizon could process the IDOC's hospitalization claims. After making this finding, the IDOC
instructed Corizon to revise its rates to the Medicaid reimbursement rate mandated by the statute.
There also is no "cogent reason" for refusing to defer to the IDOC for purposes of the
dispute in this lawsuit. The IDOC's construction of Section 20-237B saves taxpayer dollars and
limits the department's financial exposure. Likewise, there is no basis to distinguish between
services provided to prisoners brought to the PMC by Corizon versus the IDOC when there is no
contract that limits the payor's exposure. Indeed, should this Court rule otherwise, the savings
both the legislature and the IDOC sought to achieve will, unfortunately, evaporate.

V.

CONCLUSION

For all of the aforesaid reasons, the Court should find for purposes of the dispute in this
lawsuit that "state board of correction" as used in Idaho Code§ 20-237B(l) and "department of
correction" as used in Idaho Code § 20-237B(2), include Corizon. Corizon is an agent of the
State in all regards for the purposes of providing healthcare to IDOC inmates. As an agent of the
State in the provision of health care, Corizon steps into the shoes of the State and is thereby
subject to the Medicaid rate of reimbursement in Idaho Code § 20-237B. The IDOC's decision
that Corizon is subject to this statutory cap is entitled to deference.
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